Inductive Knowledge Paradox Essay -- Philosophy Reasoning

In Nelson Goodman’s The new riddle of induction, the problem of inductive knowledge is brought into question and a collection of possible solutions are presented. The paradox of inductive knowledge has been misunderstood into bringing forth a radical ideology of relativism by philosophers such as Quine and a variety of other modern thinkers, however a possible solution presented by Hempel and a new version outlined in this paper present a different case all together concerning the acquisition of knowledge. In order to understand the new paradox presented in this paper the argument presented in the original raven paradox has to be made clear. The paradox of the raven stems from the belief that viewed scientific phenomena, in connection to a hypothesis in fact does not necessarily lead to truth but instead only serves to strengthen the held hypothesis regardless of what facts the evidence presents. The belief that all ravens are black under normal scientific standards is thought as being supported by the evidence of only black ravens being observed, in logic such a statement would be described as their being such a thing that it is a raven and it is black. From this statement a logically equivalent hypothesis can be made, if an object is not black it holds that it is not a raven, this statement unlike the initial hypothesis of all ravens being black however presents problems, all evidence of non-black objects seems to strengthen the prior held belief even though there is virtually no co nnection between all those possible objects and the raven. The observation of non-black things that are not-ravens strengthening the hypothesis unjustifiably is arguably showing how inductive reasoning is ungrounded in truth, however Hempel ... ...r a possible world, which itself is a problem. The issue of inductive knowledge is still one that remains unsolved, however in the various attempts at a solution the problem has changed from being one of a seemingly impossible actual knowledge to a further examination into a criterion of meaning. Because of the misinterpretation of this paradox there has been a great deal of confusion over the legitimacy of modern science however the paradox itself can be seen as only a matter of philosophy and is more concerned with the solution to a long standing philosophical puzzle then a critique of modern science. Works Cited Nelson Goodman, The new riddle of induction; knowledge readings in contemporary epistemology, oxford university press: 2005. Willard Quine, Two dogmas of empiricism; From a logical point of view 2nd edition, Harvard university press: 1980.